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This is the first of two articles designed to enable the common law
lawyer to distinguish civil annulments for fraud from Roman Catholic
declarations of nullity on grounds of defective consent.
FRAUD AND ERROR IN THE
CANON LAW OF MARRIAGE
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., J.C.D.*
A READER OF THE CATHOLIC LAWYER has asked for a statement
of the Canon Law on fraudulent marriage. The direct answer is that
there is no Canon Law on the subject because fraud, as such, makes
marriage neither void nor even voidable in the law of the Catholic
Church.'
It is understandable that lawyers who are familiar with civil annul-
ments - particularly as they are granted in New York State - might well
misunderstand the grounds upon which the Catholic Church grants
declarations of nullity. It is possible, for instance, that a marriage which
has been annulled on grounds of fraud by a civil court might also be
declared null and void from its inception by an ecclesiastical court on the
grounds that error had vitiated the consent of one of the parties at the
time of the marriage.
The fact that the error was the result of fraudulent representations is
immaterial. The court will examine the nature and effect of the error,
not its cause. In consequence, this paper will discuss the Canon Law in
terms of error, not fraud.
It is an ancient principle that fraud or error inducing consent does not
invalidate matrimonial consent actually given. This rule of the Canon
Law was applied in a case decided by Pope Urban III (1185-1187) and
the decision was canonized as a binding precedent by its incorporation in
the Decretals of Gregory IX.2 A bailiff had contracted an invalid mar-
riage and had entered his suit for declaration of nullity before a local ec-
clesiastical judge. He then moved to another place, where he deceived a
woman and so induced her to marry him, saying that the decree of nullity
had been granted. Actually the case was still pending at the time of the
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany; Professor of Comparative Law in the Graduate
Division of the School of Law of St. John's University.
'As in American common law, so in Canon Law, fraud in the inducement does
not make a contract void. If an act or a contract is induced by fraud, Canon 1684,
§1 affords the remedy of judgment for rescission; the marriage contract, however, is
excluded from the category of rescissible contracts. Cf. Can. 1069, §2; 1118-1127.
'C. 18, X, De sponsal. et matr., IV, 1.
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bailiff's second marriage. When the decree
declaring the first marriage a nullity was
granted, the second marriage was discov-
ered, and the Pope was asked to pronounce
on its validity. He answered, "The bailiff
and the second woman consented to each
other . . . let the man be given a penance
and deprived of marital cohabitation during
that period; after that they may remain in
marital association." 3
Error and Matrimonial Consent
CANON 1081. §1. Marriage is effected
by the consent of the parties lawfully
expressed between persons who are
capable according to law; and this con-
sent no human power can supply.
§2. Matrimonial consent is an act of the
will by which each party gives and ac-
cepts a perpetual and exclusive right
over the body, for acts which are of
themselves suitable for the generation
of children.
The principles of Canon 104 regarding
the effect of error upon the validity of acts
are the following: error invalidates the act
if it is an error concerning the substance of
the act; error invalidates the act if the error
is not substantial but is made a condition
sine qua non of the act; no other error
nullifies an act unless that error is given
invalidating effect by some explicit provi-
sion of law. These principles are specifically
applied to marriage in Canons 1082-1086,
and the effect of conditions attached to
matrimonial consent is set down in Canon
1092.
There is no question of dissolving the marriage
by dispensation; the scanty statement of facts in-
dicates that the second marriage had been con-
summated, so that it would have been useless to
ask for such a dispensation.
Fraud is related to error. Every success-
ful fraud causes error in its victim. By the
knowingly false representation, he is de-
ceived. But error may exist as a result of a
man's ignorance or as a result of his in-
correct inference, without any fraud prac-
ticed upon him by another person. Error
affects consent, for the will in an act of
consent elects an object presented to it by
the mind. If the mind is in error, the object
is imperfectly or incorrectly presented and
choice made upon such a premise is not
always the same choice that would have
been made if the object were correctly
known. Because of this intimate influence
of error upon consent, and because it is
consent that makes marriage, 4 the Church
will examine the validity of a marriage
alleged to have been contracted through
error. It is only error that truly destroys
consent that makes a marriage void. We
shall draw the outlines of the canonical doc-
trines concerning errors which nullify
marriage.
Error of Personal Identity
CANON 1083. §1. Error regarding the
person makes marriage invalid.
Error concerning the partner in marriage
is the subject of Canon 1083. An error of
identity of that person invalidates mar-
riage. From the very concept of matri-
monial consent,r" which is defined as an act
of will by which each party gives to and
accepts from the other the marital right,
it follows that the act of consent is a
mutual act between two persons, each of
whom is known to and identified by the
other. Certainly, if A intends to give such
'Cf. Can. 1081.
'Can. 1081, §2.
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consent to B and to receive B's consent
in return, A cannot by that same act give
such consent to C.
The classical case of mistaken identity
in marriage is that recorded in the Book of
Genesis, Chapter 29, verses 18 to 24. Jacob
had served his Uncle Laban for seven
years, in expectation of being rewarded with
the hand of Rachel, the beautiful younger
daughter whom Jacob had kissed on their
first meeting. Laban craftily substituted Lia
who "was blear-eyed," bringing her to
Jacob at night. Jacob discovered the fraud
in the light of morning and protested to his
uncle, who alleged the local custom of
giving elder daughters in marriage before
their younger sisters. Jacob acquiesced and
served another seven years for Rachel. St.
Thomas 6 says that Jacob and Lia were
"not married by their lying together, which
happened by error, but by the consent
given later."
A case of mistaken identity in marriage
rarely occurs, but there is one reported in
which the Roman Rota affirmed nullity of
the marriage. John Wang, a very busy
farmer, wished to marry a widow, Cecilia
Lu. He had not met her, but his son Paul
reported to him that she was well-to-do and
comely. John sent his agent to negotiate
for the marriage. When the agent ap-
proached Cecilia through an intermediary,
she professed herself content with her
widowhood, but suggested that Anastasia
Sang might be honored to receive John's
proposal. The intermediary made arrange-
ments with Anastasia, and John's agent
thought it not necessary to advise his prin-
cipal of the substitution. John met Anas-
tasia for the first time at the altar, but it
" Summa Theologica, Suppl., q. 51, a. 1, ad 4.
was only after the ceremony, when the
bride's heavy veil was lifted, that John
perceived that the woman was not Cecilia.
7
It cannot be said that John consented to
marry Anastasia "because he believed her
to be Cecilia." His erroneous belief, that
the woman beside him in church was
Cecilia, caused him to go through a cere-
mony with Anastasia; but it did not, in any
sense, cause him to consent to marry
Anastasia. He therefore was not married to
Anastasia.
Error of Quality Equivalent to
Error of Person
CANON 1083. §2. Error regarding a
quality of the person, even though it
is the cause of the contract, invalidates
marriage in the following cases only:
10. If the error regarding the quality
amounts to an error regarding the per-
son.
The second paragraph of Canon 1083
indicates that an error concerning a quality
of the person may amount to an error of
person. St. Alphonsus s set down three
rules for determining whether, in a given
case, the error of quality is such as to
invalidate the marriage because that error
is equivalent to an error of person. It is so
when (1) the quality is made a condition
upon whose verification the matrimonial
consent depends, (2) the quality, being
found in only one individual, identifies the
person, (3) when the prevailing intent is to
marry a person endowed with such quality,
so that the intent to marry an individual is
subordinated to the purpose of having a
' S. R. Rota, coram Heiner, 16 April 1913, Dec.
XXI, Vol. V, p. 242.
8 It Theologia Moralis nn. 1013-1016 (Prato
1839).
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wife or husband so endowed. That the rules
were worked out by speculation, a priori,
is evidenced by the fact that it is extremely
difficult to find reports of cases in which the
second and third rules were applied. Cases
under the first rule are common enough,
and some of them will be discussed below,
under the heading "Error of Personal
Quality Made a Condition of Consent."
A decision of the Sacred Congregation
of the Council, 9 Aug. 1817,9 illustrates the
second rule. Cassandra Luci alleged the
nullity of her marriage to Vincent Ven-
turini, the son of Stephen Venturini, be-
cause she married him on his representation
that he was Vincent Bellonch, son of
Stephen Bellonch, and nephew of a very
wealthy Spanish clergyman named Bel-
lonch. Cassandra knew Vincent Venturini
personally; in fact, she alleges that she was
unwilling to marry him because she found
him "horrible to look at," and that her
abhorrence was overcome only by the con-
sideration that he was the nephew of a
wealthy man. But the decision accepts the
argument made by the Defender of the
Marriage Bond; that she gave her marital
consent to a man present and known to
her, so that her error regarding his family
connections did not enter into the determi-
nation of his identity.
If Cassandra had never known either
Vincent Venturini or Vincent Bellonch, and
had arranged to marry Vincent Bellonch,
identified as the nephew of the wealthy
Spaniard, and if Vincent Venturini had
appeared at the wedding, calling himself
Vincent Bellonch, the marriage would have
'The decision is reprinted in VI Codicis luris
Canonici Fontes, 229, N. 3954 (Gasparri ed.
1932). We know of no decision affirming nullity
on this ground.
been void. Her error regarding the man's
name and family connections would then
have been equivalent to an. error of person.
The third rule was applied by the Rota
in a 1941 decision. 10 We can find no other
decision under this rule. The plaintiff had
married soon after his conversion to
Christianity, and while he was still living
with his tribesmen between Mt. Everest
and the Ganges. According to their custom,
there were only two classes of marriageable
women; one not a virgin was a widow.
The arrangements for marriage, in
reference to property, differed markedly
according to the bride's classification. The
plaintiff made a friend his agent to arrange
a virgin marriage, and the agent so con-
tracted in the plaintiff's behalf with a man
who was guardian of a nubile sister-in-
law. The bride showed reluctance to fulfill
her guardian's contract, showing resistance
even during the marriage ceremony. After
her guardian intervened and spoke to her
out of hearing of the other participants,
she permitted the ceremony to be com-
pleted. Tribal custom demanded that the
first month of marriage be spent by the
bride in the home of her own people, and
that cohabitation with her husband be not
had until after that period. The plaintiff's
bride had gone to her guardian's home
after the marriage. She was later visited
there by her husband's agent, sent to in-
vestigate reports that she was weeping
incessantly. The agent discovered that she
was pregnant by her guardian brother-in-
law, and when this fact was reported to the
plaintiff he refused to take her into his
house.
The Rota found that the intention of
T°S. R. Rota, coram Heard, 21 June 1941, Dec.
XLVIII, Vol. XXXIII, p. 528.
APRIL, 1955
the plaintiff was to have a virgin marriage,
and that he was so influenced by tribal
concepts that this intent prevailed over the
intent to marry any specified person. In
explaining this application of the third rule
stated by St. Alphonsus, the Court said
that the virginal status of the bride was a
condition implied in the plaintiff's matri-
monial consent. This remark of the Court
indicates the real difficulty of distinguish-
ing cases under this rule from cases under
the rule of conditioned consent. One may
speculate that if the case had arisen in
Europe, where conditioned consent is more
generally understood than in India, the
case might have been taken under the first
rule. Conversely, the absence of any very
rigid European mores classifying brides
with reference to their personal qualities,
may be one reason why the third rule is
illustrated by the canonical writers only by
reference to hypothetical situations.
Error of Servile Condition
CANON 1083. §2. Error regarding a
quality of the person, even though it
is the cause of the contract, invalidates
marriage in the following cases only:
20. If a free person contracts marriage
with a person whom he or she believes
to be free, but who is on the contrary in
a condition of slavery in the proper
sense.
Thus the Canon establishes that if a
free person contract marriage with one
whom he thinks free, whereas the person is
bound to slavery in the strict sense, the
marriage is invalid. It is hardly necessary
to remark that it is not the fact of slavery,
but the erroneous belief regarding freedom,
which is the basis of the impediment; a
free man can validly marry a slave if he
knows of her bondage." Application of
the Canon demands no inquiry as to
whether the free man would have married
if he had known of the other's slavery.
There remain very few regions where
slavery is in use, and the enactment has,
consequently, little practical application.
However, slavery may exist in some remote
regions, as is indicated by a canonist writing
in China in 1936, "In China there is no, or
scarcely any, slavery strictly so called." 11
Canon 1083, §2, 2' has behind it the
inertia of very ancient law, and will prob-
ably remain in the law of the Church until
the world can show no vestige of slavery.
The Canon has one characteristic which
merits close attention. It contains a positive
canonical enactment which makes of a
matter of knowledge a direct impediment
invalidating marriage. All other defects of
knowledge affect the validity of marriage
only when they vitiate consent. Error as to
servile condition makes marriage invalid
even when it has nothing to do with the
identity of the person and is not made a
condition of consent. If at the time of the
marriage this erroneous belief exists, the
marriage is null by the law of the Church,
though the consent given is sufficient by the
law of nature.
Statutory Nullity of
Marriage Induced by Fraud
A Georgia statute offers an interesting
parallel to this invalidating impediment
created by Canon Law. Canon 1083,
§2, 20 , as we have seen, makes a marriage
void by operation of law when a free person
112 Gasparri, De Matrimonio 25-26 (1932).
2 Payen, De Matrimonio 42 (1936).
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entertains the erroneous belief there speci-
fied. Section 53-103 of the Georgia Code
provides, "To constitute an actual contract
of marriage, the parties must consent
thereto voluntarily and without any fraud
practiced on either . . . " and Section
53-104 declares "Marriages of persons ...
unwilling to contract or fraudulently in-
duced to contract shall be void."
This law of Georgia is quite different
from most of the state enactments regard-
ing fraud in marriage. Typical is the enact-
ment of the New York Domestic Relations
Law, Section 7, subdivision 4, which pro-
vides: "Voidable marriages. A marriage is
void from the time its nullity is declared
by a court of competent jurisdiction if either
party thereto: ... Consent to such marriage
by reason of force, duress, or fraud." The
Georgia enactment, like the Canon Law on
error respecting condition of servitude,
makes the marriage so contracted void ab
initio. In Mackey v. Mackey,' the Supreme
Court of Georgia denied an action for
nullity because certain legislative and con-
stitutional provisions "impel us to the con-
clusion that the constitutional and legislative
declarations manifest a resolute intent that
resort may not be had to a court of equity
for annulment of a de facto marriage by a
single verdict upon any ground which the
law makes a ground for divorce in an
action at law." 14 Yet the Court does not
deny the void character of such marriages,
implied in the further language of Section
53-104:1" "The issue of such marriages,
198 Ga. 707, 32 S.E. 2d 764, 767 (1945).
H The Code of Georgia, §30-102, recites: "The
following grounds shall be sufficient to authorize
the granting of a total divorce: . . . 4. Force,
menaces, duress, or fraud in obtaining the mar-
riage."
"Quoted in Mackey v. Mackey, supra note 13, at
766.
before they are annulled and declared void
by a competent court, shall be legitimate.
In the latter two cases [marriages of per-
sons unwilling to contract, or fraudulently
induced to contract], however, a subse-
quent consent and ratification of the
marriage, freely and voluntarily made,
accompanied by cohabitation as husband
and wife, shall render valid the marriage."
(Emphasis supplied.)
If, for example, two unbaptized persons
had contracted a marriage in which consent
was induced by fraud, and one of them, on
becoming a Catholic, sued for a decree of
nullity in a Church court, the tribunal
would have to take cognizance of the
competent state legislation. It is certain that
the state has power to establish reasonable
impediments to the marriages of the un-
baptized, who are, because they lack
baptism, in no way subject to the authority
of the Church.", If the fraudulent marriage
had taken place under the Georgia juris-
diction, the Church court would find it a
nullity because of the antecedent impedi-
ment competently established.' 7 If the
fraudulent marriage had taken place in the
New York jurisdiction, the tribunal could
not, on the basis of the statute, find the
marriage null, for the New York statute
makes such marriages "voidable" only. In
New York, the law does not prevent the
marriage coming into existence; it attempts
to put into the hands of the courts a power
to dissolve the marriage. The Church can
recognize no power of human origin to
dissolve an existing marriage, consum-
I Gasparri, De Matrimonio 146 (1932).
17 In determining what quality of fraud makes a
marriage void under the Georgia statute, the
Church court would have to follow the intent of
the Georgia Legislature, particularly as that intent
may be indicated by holdings of the Georgia
courts.
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mated or not. In the hypothesis of such a
marriage occurring in New York, the
Church court could find the marriage null
only if the fraud had effected an error of
personal identity or an erroneous condition
sine qua non. The Church, bound by natural
and divine law, can take cognizance of the
power of human law to make a marriage
void, but the Church can recognize no
human power to make a valid marriage
voidable.
Error in a Condition Sine Qua Non
The term "condition sine qua non" is, of
course, adopted from the phraseology of the
logicians.' 8
An erroneous belief regarding some
quality of the partner may accompany
marital consent, or may motivate marital
consent, or it may be an indispensable
requirement for the existence of marital
consent. Only in the last mentioned case is
there an erroneous condition sine qua non;
in this circumstance alone is consent with-
held by the fact that the condition postu-
lated is not verified.
Error of Personal Quality
Made a Condition of Consent
According to Canon 1083, §2, error con-
cerning personal qualities of the partner,
even if such error be the motive for marry-
"A condition of this kind is phrased, for example,
"Unless Anna is honest, John will not marry her";
whereas a condition sine qua is put this way, "If
Anna is wealthy, John will marry her." The sine
qua non antecedent is described as irreplaceable
or indispensable. The sine qua antecedent is re-
placeable. Where the antecedent is replaceable, the
proposition asserts one reason which will induce
John to .marry Anna; lacking that reason, he may
still marry her. Where the antecedent is irreplace-
able, the proposition asserts that he will marry her
only if she is honest; if she is not honest, we infer
from the proposition itself that John will not
marry her. Cf. Hartman, A Textbook of Logic
128 (1936).
ing, does not invalidate the marriage;
except the error concern freedom or be
equivalent to an error of identity. This is
simply an application of the first principle
set forth in Canon 104; errors respecting
qualities of a marriage partner are not sub-
stantial errors. But such errors will nullify
the marriage, according to the second
principle of Canon 104, if they are postu-
lated by the party in error as indispensable
antecedents to his matrimonial consent.
In one case which was successful before
the Roman Rota,' 9 there was evidence that
before arrangements for the marriage were
complete the husband had had serious
doubts of the good character of the defend-
ant. She was six years older than he, and
his friends were emphatic in urging him
not to marry a woman whose virtue they
had reason to question. The seriousness
and perplexity of his mind on this matter
were indicated by evidence that he had
directly and through others warned her not
to marry him if she were not a virgin, that
he had made this the test by which the
fault-finding friends would be silenced, and
that he had repeatedly threatened her that
if he found her not intact he would "put
her out of the house and have nothing to
do with her." He did put her out a few
days after the marriage and proclaimed his
reason for doing so. He never saw her again
until the trial in the diocesan court, which
was begun six years after the marriage was
celebrated. The Rota found that the plain-
tiff had made the fact of her probity and
the specific fact of her virginity indispen-
sable conditions to his act of matrimonial
consent.
" S. R. Rota, coram Massimi, 13 June 1924, Dec.
XXV, Vol. XVI, p. 223, and the definitive sentence
in the same case, coram Hindringer, 1 April 1925,
Dec. XX, Vol. XVII, p. 149.
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Another case illustrates a condition pos-
tulating the partner's sincerity in a special
promise of future conduct. The case orig-
inated in French North Africa. The bride's
grandfather was an Alsatian, and it was
shown that her whole family were intense
in their French patriotism. Before the mar-
riage, she required the groom, an Italian
subject, to swear upon her father's portrait
and in the presence of her Alsatian grand-
father that he would become a French
citizen as soon as possible. She was preg-
nant soon after the marriage, and left her
husband within fourteen months from the
date of the ceremony, charging him with
insincerity in his sworn promise, as he had
taken no steps to change his citizenship.
On leaving him, she immediately secured
a decree of annulment in a civil court and
regained her French citizenship. She re-
fused pleas for reconciliation as long as
ten years after the marriage, always alleging
no other ground than his insincerity in that
one matter.
Monsignor Grazioli, writing for the Court
in the second decision 2 0 points out that the
condition placed by Helen was a true con-
dition sine qua non. He notes that her
intention was not simply to make her hus-
band a French citizen; rather it was to save
herself from permanent loss of French citi-
zenship, which she could never recover as
the wife of an Italian subject. Thus, she
made her consent to be wife to Francesco
depend indispensably upon the sincerity of
his promise to renounce his Italian alle-
giance and become a Frenchman. When
the promise is proved to have been insin-
cere, the consent which depended upon its
sincerity is seen not to have operated. In
S. R. Rota, coram Grazioli, 17 Dec. 1942, Dec.
LXXVIII, Vol. XXXIV, p. 815, 825.
the earlier decision, 21 the Court saw in the
evidence warrant for the conclusion that
the promise was regretted by the patriotic
Italian officer, but no sufficient proof that
he gave it insincerely. 22
Errors of Quality Tabulated
Monsignor Doheny has tabulated the
decisions of the Rota given in the years
1909 to 1938.23 One hundred five of these
decisions were given in cases where the
allegation of nullity was predicated on some
error of quality, (of personal quality or of
fortune), or of sincerity in some promise.
The allegation was, of course, that the
quality in question had been made an
irreplaceable condition of matrimonial con-
sent. In these decisions, nullity of the
marriage was affirmed in only thirty-one
instances. The conditions postulated in-
cluded: legitimacy of the bride's birth; her
virginity; that she had had illicit relations
with no one but her fiance; that the man
was father of the child she carried; that one
or the other was free from venereal disease,
or from epilepsy or other diseases; that the
husband was not a Freemason; that one or
the other was sincere in promises respecting
the practice of the Catholic religion or the
Catholic upbringing of children, respecting
the future domestic arrangements, respect-
ing pursuit of a special profession or busi-
ness; that one or the other was wealthy,
" S. R. Rota, coram Wynen, 1 Feb. 1937, Dec.
VIII, Vol. XXIX, p. 55, 64.
--As the decisions were not in accord on this
ground of nullity, the case was not successful on
this count. Both decisions, however, agreed that
the solemnization of the marriage was defective,
so that the second sentence made nullity definitive
on that ground.
23 Doheny, Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial
Cases, Formal Procedure (1948).
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or of noble blood, or of good character;
that the husband had no illegitimate child.
At least one decision affirmed nullity on
each of the grounds enumerated.
No decision was affirmative where the
grounds alleged were: conditions predicat-
ing capacity to beget a child, desistance
from addiction to drink or narcotics,
abandonment of a military career. ' 4
It will be seen that the specific quality of
person or of fortune, or the specific subject
matter of the promise, is of no substantial
concern to the court. The subject matter of
the condition is important as a matter of
evidence, because proof that matrimonial
consent truly was made to depend upon
verification of the postulate will depend
upon indications that the matter weighed
very heavily in the mind of the person
asserted to have made it a condition. This,
it may well be said, is a subjective standard
of nullity, difficult of proof, and full of
menace to the rights of the other party.
Problems Arising from
Conditional Consent
Yet the rule, that nullity of marriage is
the consequence when a fact made the
irreplaceable antecedent of matrimonial
consent is not verified, arises out of the
very laws of human thought. A man's con-
sent does not exist if he makes its existence
depend upon the pre-existence of a fact
which does not subsist. Matrimonial con-
sent is the only cause which can affect a
marriage; there is no human power which
can supply consent, making a marriage
where no consent exists.2 5
Human power, exercised through com-
' Cf. Doheny, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1006-1014.
'Can. 1081, §1.
petent law, can bind a man to behave in
society as if he were married. This is the
effect of the Canons which forbid a person
in such case from entering a new marriage,
or neglecting his social duties to husband
or wife, without a decree of nullity. -6 The
children of such a marriage are legitimate
if either spouse had a bona fide belief in
validity of the marriage at the time of their
conception or of their birth.2 7 Other Canons
establish rules of procedure and evidence
which require the person seeking a declara-
tion of nullity to present proof of a very
high standard. 28
That the law of nature permits a man to
give his matrimonial consent, subject to
verification of a condition, follows from the
fact that man's will is physically free. As
it is said in the Book of Ecclesiasticus,
"God made man from the beginning, and
left him in the hands of his own counsel." 29
Nevertheless, the moral dangers arising
from the practice of entering marriage con-
ditionally are evident, and have given
concern to the authorities of the Church
wherever that practice has arisen. Gener-
ally, they have been content with warning
Can. 1069, §2. Even though the former marriage
be invalid or dissolved for any reason, it is not
therefore allowed to contract another until the
nullity or dissolution of the former shall have been
established according to law and with certainty.
Cf. Can. 1019-1021, 1030, 1103, 470, 1107, 379,
1118-1127, 1813-1816, 1960-1992, 1933.
' Can. 1015, §4; 1113-1115.
' Cf. especially Can. 1960-1992; Can. 1014, 1015,
§e, and 1086 (on presumptions favoring the valid-
ity of marriage); Can. 1968, 1969, 1984, 1986,
1987, 1990-1992 (on the intervention of the De-
fender of the Marriage Bond). The innocent
spouse is protected from the adventurer, as far as
the law can afford such protection, by the canon
which denies standing in court to a plaintiff who
was the guilty cause of nullity. Can. 1971, §1, n. 1.
" Ecclesiasticus XV, 14.
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against the moral dangers involved. The
practice was never common among Catho-
lics of the Oriental rites or among Protes-
tants.3 0 Yet, the synods of some Oriental
rites followed Latin precedents in regulating
matrimonial conditions. 31 The new Canon
Law for the Catholic Oriental Churches,
effective May 2, 1949, enacts, "Marriage
cannot be contracted under condition." 32
The Canon is interpreted as a prohibition
merely, not as annulling all marriages con-
tracted subject to condition.3 3
Cardinal Gasparri, who was president of
the Papal Commission charged with prep-
aration of the Code of Canon Law for the
Latin Church, published in 1917, relates
that the Commission had under considera-
tion a canon which would have invalidated
any marriage contracted subject to any
condition whatever. The canon, which had
been written by Father Wernz, and upon
which all of the Commissioners were
agreed, disappeared from later drafts, and
there was substituted for it a draft canon
which was promulgated in the official text
of the Code as Canon 1092. No explana-
tion of the substitution made in the drafts
is recorded in the minutes of the Com-
mission.3 4
The Instruction of the Sacred Congre-
gation of the Sacraments, 29 June 1941,
establishes procedure for parish priests
investigating the free state of persons to
be married. The ninth paragraph of that
' Wernz, lus Matrimoniale n. 294 (Giachetti,
Prato 1912).
"Coussa, De lure Ecclesiastico Orientali, De
Matrimonio 179 (1950).
"2Can. 83, Motu Propio Crebrae allatae sunt.
"Galtier, Le Mariage, Orientale et Occidentale
213 (1950).
2 Gaspari, De Matrimonio 73, n. 2 (1932).
instruction directs the priest to attempt to
discourage the parties from placing condi-
tions by which their consent may be
suspended or invalidated. If there is some
condition which the parties feel they may
lawfully attach, the priest is to consult the
local Bishop and to follow his directions
in the matter.35
Effects of Conditional Consent
CANON 1092. A condition once placed
and not revoked:
10. If it is a condition regarding a fu-
ture event which is necessary, or impos-
sible, or immoral but not contrary to
the substance of marriage, it is to be
considered as not having been made;
2°. If it concerns the future and is con-
trary to the substance of marriage, it
makes the marriage invalid;
3*. If it concerns the future and is licit,
it suspends the validity of the marriage;
4. If it concerns the past or the present,
the marriage will be valid or not accord-
ing as the matter concerning which the
condition is made, exists or not.
Canon 1092 of the Code of Canon Law
of the Latin Church does not explicitly
forbid one to attach a condition to his
matrimonial consent. The first section of
the Canon states a presumption of law that
conditions postulating future events that are
necessary or impossible or immoral are
considered not to have been attached to
the consent. The law presumes that a man
is not serious when he postulates the in-
evitable, saying, "I marry you if the sun
will rise tomorrow"; or the impossible,
English translation of the text of this Instruction
is found in 2 Bouscaren, Canon Law Digest 253
et seq. (1942).
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saying, "I marry you if the sun rises twice
tomorrow." The presumption of law is also
that a man does not seriously mean to
make the validity of his marriage depend
upon some immoral action in the future,
as, for example, "I marry you if in sexual
intercourse I shall find you a virgin." Never-
theless, if there is proof that the condition
was meant seriously and not verified, the
condition invalidates the consent. That is
the holding of the Rota in a number of
cases.
36
If the condition postulates a future event
that is licit, for example, "I marry you if you
shall get your father's blessing," the con-
sent is suspended until the father gives his
blessing; the parties are not married until
the blessing is given, but the moment it is
given their consent becomes effective and
they are married.3 7 They must, of course,
abstain from any use of marital rights in
the interim. If the event postulated is one
past or present, the marriage is valid or not
according as the postulated fact exists or
does not.38 Most of the facts postulated in
the cases tabulated by Monsignor Doheny,
and discussed above, were of this nature.
That the bride was a legitimate daughter,
for example, is a past fact; that she is now
not an epileptic is a present fact.
Error of Law; the Nature of
Marriage
Up to this point, our attention has been
given to errors of fact; errors 6f personal
identity, of qualities of person or of fortune,
errors regarding promises, are all of that
Cf., e.g., S. R. Rota, coram Hindringer, 1 April
1925, Dec. XX, Vol. XVII, p. 149, 150; we have
discussed this case above, p. 89.
"Can. 1092, n. 3.
' Can. 1092, n. 4.
sort. The nature of the marriage relation
and its essential qualities are said to be
matters of law, and errors concerning these
things are called errors of law.
CANON 1082. §1. In order that matri-
monial consent may be possible it is
necessary that the contracting parties
be at least not ignorant that marriage is
a permanent society between man and
woman for the procreation of children.
§2. This ignorance is not presumed after
puberty.
Marriage is by nature a permanent
society of man and woman for the purpose
of begetting children. 39 No man can marry
if he does not know what marriage is.
Whether he simply lacks knowledge of the
nature of marriage°4 0 or is in positive error
regarding its nature, 41 he cannot validly
consent to marry. Thus, the Rota has found
a marriage null where it was shown that
the man did not know the nature of the
marriage relation. 42 The parties had married
when he was thirty and the girl only
thirteen. After the pagan marriage cere-
mony in which the parties together wor-
shipped the skies and the earth, the couple
kept a common home for four years. Canon
1082, §2 states that ignorance of the nature
of marriage is not presumed to exist after
puberty, but the evidence in this case
showed that this man was simple minded,
if not actually imbecillic, and that in the
four years of their cohabitation he mani-
fested a complete lack of interest in and
understanding of his rights and duties as a
husband. As the parties were pagans when
'Can. 1082.
41 Can. 1082.
"Can. 104.
1"S. R. Rota, coram Prior, 14 Nov. 1919, Dec.
XIX, Vol. XI, p. 170.
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they married and throughout their cohabi-
tation, the decision rests on no positive law
of the Church, for she cannot legislate for
the unbaptized. The Canon, therefore, is
taken only as a formulation of the natural
law, and the decision is that the man lacked
such knowledge of the married state as
nature requires of one who is to give real
consent to a marriage.
In other cases, the Rota has said that
parties must know that children are begot-
ten in marriage by some bodily act between
man and woman, though the parties may
not know before marriage what organs are
employed in this act and may be ignorant
of the manner in which the organs are used
for this purpose. Thus the Rota rejected
the suit of a young man who alleged that
the girl he married had not sufficient knowl-
edge of the nature of marriage to make
her capable of true marital consent. She
was twenty-three when she married, she
had had a high school course in biology,
she had frequented the cinema, and she
admitted that she had enjoyed being kissed
by her fiance. She testified that she had
known that children were carried before
birth inside the bodies of their mothers,
but she asserted that she had thought the
children came there only as a result of
divine blessing. There was no evidence to
support her assertion of belief in such
divine intervention, and the Court found
no evidence to prove her ignorant that
procreation occurs through mutual cor-
poral acts of man and woman.43
' S. R. Rota, coram Jullien, 21 Dec. 1938, Dec.
LXXVII, Vol. XXX, p. 715; affirming the sentence
coram Heard, 26 Oct. 1937, Dec. LXVI, Vol.
XXIX, p. 655; reversing sentences of the Metro-
politan Court of Krakow in Poland, given 20 June
1934 and 4 April 1935; the Defender of the Mar-
riage Bond in the Court at Krakow had appealed
to the Rota.
Error of Law; the Validity
of Marriage
CANON 1085. The knowledge or belief
that the marriage is null does not nec-
essarily exclude matrimonial consent.
Erroneous opinion, by which a person
contracting marriage believes that marriage
void, has not the effect of invalidating the
marriage. 44 A plaintiff before the Rota
alleged that because he had been raised
and educated in Bogota, Colombia, until
he came to the United States at the age of
sixteen, he was firmly of the opinion that a
Catholic could not validly marry except
before his pastor. That was the law of
solemnization enacted by the Council of
Trent and promulgated at an early date in
South America. The marriage attacked in
this case had been contracted before a civil
official at Allentown, Pennsylvania, on
February 10, 1908 when the plaintiff was
nineteen. The law of Trent was never
promulgated in the State of Pennsylvania
or in most of the American states. The
decree Ne Temere, by which the law re-
quiring the presence of an authorized priest
and two witnesses for the validity of the
marriages of Catholics anywhere in the
world, although published August 2, 1907,
was not effective until April 19, 1908.
Actually, therefore, the law of the Church
controlling this marriage did not require, on
pain of nullity, that it be solemnized before
a priest. The Court declared that the
plaintiff's opinion in the matter did not
nullify his consent. His error, it was pointed
out, did not touch the substance of the
marriage but only its external form or
solemnity.
However, the marriage was held a nullity
because the plaintiff had gone through the
"Can. 1085.
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ceremony only to satisfy the importunity of
the lady and there was adequate evidence
he had not intended a real marriage. That
he believed the civil ceremony to have no
effect, and that he left her without con-
summating the marriage, were among the
evidentiary facts confirming his assertion
that his consent was no more than
apparent. 45
Erroneous Opinion Regarding
Divorce
CANON 1084. Simple error regarding
the unity, or indissolubility, or sacra-
mental dignity of marriage, even though
it is the cause of the contract, does not
vitiate matrimonial consent.
Distinct from the nature of marriage, yet
intimately related to it, are the essential
qualities of Christian marriage. These are
enumerated in Canon 1084: that marriage
is exclusive or monogamous, that it is in-
dissoluble, and that it is a sacrament when
both parties are baptized Christians. But
the Canon declares that erroneous opinions
with respect to these essential qualities of
marriage are no obstacle to the validity of
the marriage of one holding such opinion.
The Canon cited describes such errone-
ous opinion as "simple error," and declares
that it does not nullify marriage even when
that simple error is the cause which moti-
vates a person to enter marriage. The
doctrine was applied in the famous Gould-
Castellane case. 46 It was perfectly clear that
the defendant Anna Gould believed that
" S. R. Rota, coram Prior. 16 July 1921, Dec.
XVIIl. Vol. XIII, p. 174; affirming the sentence
coram Cattani, 9 Feb. 1920, Dec. V, Vol. XII,
p. 30.
41S. R. Rota, coram Lega, 9 Dec. 1911, Dec.
XLIV, Vol. III, p. 507; coram Cattani, I Mar.
1913, Dec. XVI, Vol. V, p. 173; coram Prior.
marriage may be dissolved by divorce, at
least in certain circumstances. Although her
father was opposed to divorce, and had
raised her in that opinion, 47 she had ex-
plicitly declared that she considered she
had a right, as a Protestant 48 and as an
American, 49 to divorce Castellane if and
when she should find it necessary to her
happiness. Yet the Rota said the woman
was in the same condition as one who
might marry a girl because he believed her
wealthy; in spite of such error, and in spite
of its having been the motive for the
marriage, the marriage was valid.50
The Court 51 based this doctrine on an
instruction given by the Congregation of
the Holy Office to a missionary Bishop in
1874.12 The Bishop had asked how he was
to view marriages contracted by the natives
of his territory where the prevailing opinion
was that marriage is dissoluble, and where
the practice of divorce was very common.
The Holy Office replied that such beliefs
did not make the marriages invalid, and
cited a decision it had given in 1680,
wherein it had pointed out that the same
view of marriage had prevailed among the
Romans at the time of the Apostles, and
that St. Paul clearly indicates a conviction
that the marriages of pagans were true
8 Feb. 1915, Dec. Ii, Vol. VII, p. 20. The third
decision is summarized in I Bouscaren, Canon
Law Digest 535, and in Doheny, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 849.
1S. R. Rota, coram Prior, 8 Feb. 1915, Dec. III,
Vol. VII, p. 20, 29.
I81d. at 32-33.
' Id. at 35.
0Id. at 33.
"I ld. at 25.
" Instructio S. Officii, 9 Dec. 1874, ad Ep. S. Al-
berti, Collectanea S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Vol.
2, n. 1427.
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marriages and that pagans could contract
lawful marriages with Christians. The Court
says further 5 that persons contracting
marriage are presumed to intend a mar-
riage in the sense that God made marriage,
and this presumption stands in the face of
any errors to the contrary fostered by civil
legislation or the teaching of religious sects.
Anna Gould had testified,5 4 "I married as
one ordinarily marries. I thought of
nothing else."
One witness, a friend of the plaintiff
Castellane, had deposed, "She [Miss
Gould] told me . . . that she was not sure
of her fiance's affection, and feared to make
a mistake in marrying him, and she ex-
plicitly declared that she married him on
condition of being free to get a divorce...
and she asked me to communicate that
declaration to him." 5 The Court sets forth
the principle of law that the marriage would
be invalid only if, by an explicit act of will,
Anna Gould should have absolutely in-
tended to exclude a perpetual bond. This
would be the case if the exclusion of a
perpetual bond had actually been made a
condition sine qua non of her matrimonial
consent.5 6 The assertion of this witness
stands alone, and it is not supported by the
testimony of other witnesses who, according
to his story, were informed of it by the
intermediary. The Court therefore rejected
the contention that Miss Gould's consent
was so conditioned, on the rule that no
fact telling against the validity of marriage
can be taken as proved by one witness
unsupported and uncorroborated.
SId. at 37.
' ld. at 29.
I d. at 39.
'0 Id. at 38.
Conditions Regarding the
Essential Qualities of Marriage
From the reasoning of the Court in the
Gould decision it is clear that errors regard-
ing the monogamous character of marriage,
its perpetuity, and its sacramental character,
are governed by the second principle set
forth in Canon 104, the principle which is
applied to errors of personal quality which
do not involve identity of the person. Such
errors do not go to the substance of the
act of marital consent, and will affect it
only when they are made conditions sine
qua non. If Miss Gould's intent had been
"Unless I am free to get a divorce, I do
not marry Castellane," her erroneous belief
would have been made an indispensable
condition to her consent. If a person who
abhorred the very notion of a supernatural
order married with the intent, "Though
both of us are baptized, I consent to this
marriage only if it is not a sacrament," the
marriage would be invalid. If another per-
son, say a Mohammedan, married with this
intent, "I marry this woman only if I
remain free to take another wife later on,"
the result would be the same.
All of these conditions, and conditions
predicating a denial or limitation of the
marital right to acts of natural intercourse
suited for the begetting of children, are
called "conditions contrary to the substance
of marriage." Canon 1092, n. 2 states that
future conditions of this sort render mar-
riage invalid; the reason is because such
conditions positively exclude from the
consent of the person so attempting to con-
tract, some obligation which is of the
essence of marriage. The conditions are
usually classified according as they oppose
one or other of the "bona" or "goods" of
marriage - children, fidelity, indissolu-
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bility.5 7 Conditions or intentions contrary
to the bona were considered by the Rota
in 252 decisions given in the period 1909
to 1938, tabulated by Monsignor Doheny.
In the first class, of 153 decisions, 56 affirm
nullity.;, Of eight decisions concerned with
conditions or intentions assertedly rejecting
the obligation of fidelity, only one affirmed
nullity. 9 In 91 decisions on cases where
the intention or condition allegedly touched
the indissoluble character of marriage,
nullity of the marriage was affirmed in 26
instances.6 0
The Canonical Rule of Error
The English Rule of Fraud
The canonical doctrines of error in
marriage are of special interest to the
American lawyer because these doctrines
are an historical antecedent of the modern
American legal doctrine of fraud in mar-
riage. The doctrines we have here explained
are the same as those received in the
English ecclesiastical courts at the Reforma-
tion. After the Reformation, the doctrine on
conditional consent fell into disuse, but all
the other canonical principles on error
were applied in those courts under the
Anglican canon law. Ayliffe " sets forth
the doctrine which we find today in the
Code of Canon Law of the Catholic
Church. He says, in part: ". . . the principal
thing required to a legal marriage is the
consent of the parties contracting, which is
"' Termed technically, bonutn prolis, boniun fidei,
bonum sacramenti.
s Doheny, op. cit. supra note 23, at 959-978.
I ld. at 978-982.
Id. at 988-1003.
"Ayliffe, Parergon Juris Canonici Anglcani 361
(1726), quoted in extenso in Moss v. Moss,
[1897] P. 263, 271-273.
sufficient alone to establish such a marriage.
And tho' there is nothing more contrary
to consent than error, yet every error does
not exclude consent. . . . [T]here are four
species of error .... The first is stiled error
personae. . . . an error of this kind is not
only an impediment to a marriage contract,
but it even dissolves the contract itself,
through a defect of consent in the person
contracting. . . . A second species is stiled
error of condition; as when I think to
marry a free woman, and through a mis-
take I have contracted wedlock with a
bondwoman . . . by the canon law such an
error is an impediment to a matrimonial
contract. . . . The third species is what we
call error fortunae; and is when I think to
marry a rich wife and in truth have con-
tracted matrimony with a poor one. But
this error does not, even by the canon law,
dissolve a marriage contract made simply
and without any condition subsisting. But
'tis otherwise by that law if I have con-
tracted with a person to marry her upon
condition that she is worth so many thou-
sands pounds, and the condition is not
made good. The last species is stiled an
error of quality -viz., when a person is
mistaken in respect of the other's quality,
with whom he or she contracts. As when
a man marries Bertha, believing her to be a
chaste virgin, or of a noble family and the
like, and afterwards finds her to be a person
deflower'd or of mean parentage. But . . .
this does not render the marriage invalid;
because matrimony celebrated under such
kind of error, in point of consent, is deem'd
to be simply voluntary as to the nature and
substance of it, though in respect of the
accidents 'tis not voluntary." These are,
says Sir F. H. Jeune, President of the
Probate Division, "the principles of the
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Ecclesiastical Courts which, in nullity cases,
are the guide of this tribunal." 62 Today, the
English statutes give an action for avoid-
ance of marriage to a petitioner who was
ignorant, at the time of the marriage, of
certain facts respecting the spouse.'
Fraudulent Marriage Void or
Voidable in America
It was natural that the lay courts of
England accepted and felt themselves bound
by the canonical rule of error. They ex-
pressed the rule in terms of fraud and put
it in this form: "fraud . . . as a ground for
avoiding a marriage . . . is limited to such
fraud as procures the appearance without
the reality of consent." 4 The lay jurisdic-
tion of marriage in England derives from the
Victorian statute which expressly withdrew
the matrimonial jurisdiction from the ec-
clesiastical courts, vested that jurisdiction in
the Crown, and declared that it should
thereafter be exercised by the lay court
created by the same statute.65
The reason why this traditional rule
should have had any influence in America
is to be found in nothing so obvious as the
Statute of Victoria. The American state
statutes conferring matrimonial jurisdiction
on the courts never recite that an ecclesiasti-
cal authority is withdrawn and vested in
' Moss v. Moss, [1897] P. 263, 270.
'Marriage is voidable at the petition of a party
thereto who became aware only after the mar-
riage that the other party when entering the
marriage was: mentally deficient or subject to
periodic fits of insanity or epilepsy, infected with
communicable venereal disease, or pregnant by a
person other than the petitioner. Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1937, 1 Edw. VIt & I Geo. VI, c.
57, §7; Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo.
VI, c. 25, §8.
" Moss v. Moss, [1897] P. 263. 268-269.
'520 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §6 (1857).
the state. The American states, adopting
the Constitution, conferred upon the fed-
eral courts none of the states' jurisdiction of
domestic relations.6 The justices of the
Supreme Court, writing in explanation of
that principle, have intimated that the state
courts, at the time the Constitution was
adopted, had no matrimonial jurisdiction. 6
Some of our early American judges
entertained the view that matrimonial juris-
diction was conferred upon the courts of
the states by devolution or reverter from
the ecclesiastical courts which had compe-
tence in such matters in the colonies. 68
Other judges held the theory which has
come to be accepted quite generally in later
times, that marriage as a civil contract was
inherently subject to the Chancery jurisdic-
tion in England and our state courts ob-
tained matrimonial competence as the direct
heirs of the English Chancery."t In some
states the proposition asserting devolution
or reverter from the church courts was
overcome by statutory enactment;70  in
others it was adopted in combination with
the theory of Chancery competence. 7'
It is not difficult to perceive why, in
jurisdictions where the ecclesiastical theory
had been advanced, the traditional fraud
rule was applied in cases of nullity. In other
" Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379.
384 (1930).
17 Holmes, J., in the Popovici case cited in the
preceding note, and Daniel, J., in Barber v. Bar-
ber, 21 How. 583, 605 (U. S. 1858).
' Kent, Ch., in Wightman v. Wightman. 4 Johns.
Ch. 343, 346 (N. Y. 1830).
" Sandford, Ch., in Ferlat v. Gojon, I Hopkins
Ch. 478, 495 (N. Y. 1825).
7 Cf., e.g., New York Revised Statutes of 1827-
1828, Ch. VIII, Tit. 1, §4.
" Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. (9 C.E. Green)
516. 518-522 (1873).
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states where the courts took no notice of
that theory but relied upon a statutory
jurisdiction, the traditional rule of the
church courts was still invoked, probably
because it was the only recorded formula
for testing the validity of the marriage where
fraud was involved.7 2
Where the issue became that of void-
ability of marriage, rather than nullity of
marriage, the ecclesiastical rule, as such,
was not directly applicable. This concept
of voidable marriage, unknown to the
Canon Law and to the common law, was
introduced by statute,73 or by application
to marriage of the equity doctrine of con-
tract rescissible for fraud in the induce-
ment. 7' Yet the old rule had some influence
when the courts attempted to define the
7' Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605,
607 (1862).
" New York Revised Statutes of 1827-1828, cited
supra, note 70.
,Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. (9 C.E. Green)
516, 526; compare the dissent of Van Syckel. I.,
id. at 529 ff.
"essentialia" of marriage for the essence or
substance of marriage was the core of the
traditional rule. Inevitably the concept of
the "essentialia" was expanded in this
application, but the phrase "appearance
without the reality of consent" was a point
of departure, at least.
Though we find nowhere in the Ameri-
can decisions explicit reference to the
canonical doctrine of conditional consent,
yet the now familiar test of materiality
"Would the party have married if he knew
the true fact of the matter?", is not entirely
dissimilar to the canonical test for error
made a condition of consent, "Did the party
make the matter upon which he was in
error a condition sine qua non of his
consent?" ,
These problems of relation, comparison
and contrast between the Canon Law rule
of error and the American fraud rules will
be examined in an article to appear in the
July issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.
" Cf. supra p. 89.
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